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Abstract
This paper is the first to examine the effect of minimum price guar-
antees in a sequential search model. Minimum price guarantees are not
advertised and only known to consumers when they come to the shop.
We show that in such an environment, minimum price guarantees increase
the value of buying the good and therefore increase consumers’ reserva-
tion prices. This increase is so large that even after accounting for the
fact that some consumers will buy at lower prices, firms profits are larger
under minimum price guarantees than without it. We also show that an
equilibrium where all firms offer minimum price guarantees does not ex-
ist because of a free-riding problem. Minimum price guarantees can only
be an equilibrium phenomenon in an equilibrium where firms randomize
their decision to offer these guarantees.
JEL Classification: D40; D83; L13
Keywords: Sequential Search, Minimum Price Guarantees, Welfare Anal-
ysis
1 Introduction
It is well known that minimum price guarantees (MPGs) of one sort or the
other are found in many sectors and industries. In retail markets, minimum
price guarantees (MPGs) often take the form that sellers offer consumers who
buy their products to match any other price a competitor charges for identical
products provided that they have proof that an identical product is sold by
a competitor at a nearby shop within a well-defined time period. It is this
type of pricing matching policy that is our main interest in this paper. Major
department stores, electronic goods stores and many other retail companies offer
MPG in order to insure their potential clients against the possibility that they
later regret buying the good if a lower price has been found in a competitor’s
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store. Alternative forms of MPGs offer to give back (100+x )% of the price
difference (so called price beating strategies) or offer a ‘free lunch’ in addition
to matching prices (see, e.g., IKEA stores).1 Most firms give the price difference
only to consumers who provide evidence of lower prices elsewhere and do not
commit to change list prices.2
The effect of MPGs on the (pricing) behavior of competitors has been dis-
cussed in the economics as well as in the business and the law literature. The
main conclusion from these literatures is that despite the appearance of creat-
ing additional competitive pressure on the pricing behaviour of firms, MPGs are
in fact highly anticompetitive. One argument that has been made (cf., Salop
(1986)) is that MPGs facilitate collusion as they remove the incentives to un-
dercut. MPGs, so it is argued, do not just contain information for consumers,
but in fact convey the information to competitors that any attempt to undercut
will be automatically followed, i.e., MPGs work as a trigger strategy that helps
firms to collude. Moreover, MPGs are an extremely cheap way of doing so as
firms do not have to spend any resources on monitoring competitor’s behaviour.
Although some MPGs take the form that firms ex ante commit to change their
list prices if they are informed that a competitor has a lower price (see above),
most MPGs restrict the MPG to the client that has informed the firm of a lower
price elsewhere, i.e., list prices are unaffected. This means that most MPGs
actually are dissimilar to trigger strategies and it is therefore unclear whether
they really support collusive practices.
A second argument that has been made (cf., Png and Hirschleifer (1987))
is that MPGs are an effective way to price discriminate between shoppers and
non-shoppers. In the absence of MPGs, the activity of shoppers forces firms
to reduce prices market- wide. Shoppers provide a positive externality to non-
shoppers and force firms to set more competitive prices. With MPGs, however,
the effect of the disciplining power of shoppers is limited to these shoppers
themselves according to Png and Hirschleifer and act as a price discrimination
mechanism for firms that can set high list prices and provide shoppers with
discounts (see, also, Edlin (1997)). One shortcoming of the model proposed by
Png and Hirschleifer is that the behavior of shoppers and non-shoppers is exo-
geneously imposed: shoppers always compare all prices, and more importantly,
non-shoppers always go to one shop and buy if the price charged is below their
willingness to pay. The effect MPGs may have on the search behavior of con-
sumers is not analyzed.
According to both arguments discussed so far, the imposition of MPGs re-
duces economic welfare and this had led Edlin (1997) to investigate the legal
possibilities to prohibit MPGs under the Sherman Act. Recently, Moorthy and
Winter (2006) have argued that MPGs may also have a pro-competitive effect in
case products are horizontally differentiated and firms have different production
1The biggest supermarket in the Netherlands, Albert Heijn, introduced in spring 2009 a
policy that gave customers a free apple pie in addition to ”all your money back policy” in
case customers could show that other shops had lower prices for identical products.
2There are, however, some firms that commit to lowering list prices if competitors offer
lower prices (see, e.g., Comet Services at comet.co.uk).
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costs. In such a context MPGs may signal to consumers that the firm under
consideration really has a lower price. The lower price that is charged generates
sufficient additional demand to compensate the firm for the lower profit per
unit. High cost firms may find it too expensive to imitate the low pricing be-
havior of low cost firms, thereby allowing MPGs to work as a signalling device.
Moorthy and Winter’s model nicely illustrates how MPGs may work in markets
with product heterogeneity. Most MPGs clauses, however, stipulate that the
guarantee only comes into effect if prices of identical products at nearby shops
are compared. This means that Moorthy and Winter’s analysis is restricted to
markets where geographical differentiation is important and transportation costs
are high. Chen et al. (2001) also show that price matching policies may have
pro-competitive effects in case they are pre-announced and there are consumers
who prefer to shop at a particular store but are mindful of saving opportunities.
In this paper the “search” behaviour of customers is also exogenously given as
in Png and Hirschleifer (1987) and Varian (1980).
In this paper, we argue that MPGs have an important effect on the search
behaviour of consumers which so far has not neglected in the literature on mini-
mum price guarantees. To study this effect, we cast our model in a conventional
sequential search setup a la Stahl (1989). Moreover, we assume that there is a
certain probability that after the purchase a customer is informed about another
price quotation. This probability represents the level of information communi-
cation among the customers (as in Galeotti (2009)). In such a setting, the
main decision consumers have to make concerns their reservation price, i.e., the
maximal price at which they will buy. We show that an MPG increases this
reservation price as in the presence of MPGs consumers do not only buy the
commodity under consideration, but in addition buy an option that if they are
later informed of lower prices, they get the price difference back. Consumers
value this option and this increases their reservation prices. Higher reservation
prices, in turn, give firms the opportunity to raise their list prices, thereby in-
creasing their profits. Thus, the key point of the paper is that the option value
MPGs present impacts on the distribution of prices set by firms.
Another notable difference between our model and the existing literature is
that we consider situations where consumers do not know in advance whether
a firm that is visited has an MPG or not, i.e., MPGs are not pre-announced
or advertised and consumers just encounter them when they arrive in a store.
This setting where information about MPGs is revealed simultaneously with
price information fits major consumer markets, such as electronics shops. In
many of these shops, firms often put a label “minimum price guarantee” on
their price labels, but not on their whole assortment. Moreover, at different
points in time they have different products to which the MPG applies.3
We arrive at the following results. First, in our environment only two types
of equilibria exist: one where firms do not set MPGs at all, and one where
3We do not want to argue that this setting where MPGs are not pre-announced applies to
all markets and it is certainly an interesting question to investigate what market characteristics
are more prone to pre-announced MPGs and where pre-announcements are not observed. We
leave this as a question for future research.
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firms set MPGs with a certain positive probability, which is strictly smaller
than one. The latter equilibrium only exists when the level of communication
among consumers is relatively high. Thus, importantly, an equilibrium where
firms set MPGs for sure does not exist. This explains that in markets where
MPGs are not announced, but only discovered when a costumer arrives in the
shop, firms randomize the products for which the MPG applies. This often
happens in supermarkets and electronics stores. Second, the support of the
equilibrium price distribution of a firm that provides MPG is always above the
support of the distribution of a firm without MPG. This fact that firms setting
MPGs have prices that are not below the prices of rivals firms without MPG is
supported by empirical research (see Arbatskaya et al. (2004)). To understand
the proper effect of MPGs empirically, our paper suggest, however, that one
should not just compare prices in stores with and without MPGs, but instead
one should also inquire whether the prices in stores without MPGs are shifted
upwards when MPG can be set with some probability. Despite the fact that
consumers can execute their MPG with some positive probability if they are
informed of lower prices, consumers are strictly worse off. Moreover, the better
consumers communicate, the higher the equilibrium prices and the higher the
prices consumers expect to pay even taking the probability into account that
consumers can execute the MPG. Finally, we consider the possibility of firms
offering price-beating strategies and show that they are always dominated by
price-matching policies. The reason is that in markets where MPGs are not
pre-announced, in equilibrium MPGs only affect the reservation prices.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present the
setup of the model. Section three contains the equilibrium analysis and main
comparative statics results. In section four we show that price-beating is never
optimal. Section five briefly concludes.
2 Setup
Consider a market where two firms produce a homogenous good and have iden-
tical production costs, which we normalize to zero. Firms set prices and decide
whether or not to provide minimum price guarantees (MPGs). By providing an
MPG, a firm commits to compensate the difference between its price and the
price of the competitor, if the customer who has bought the product from the
firm provides evidence that the lower price exists.
Like in the model of Stahl (1989) there are two types of consumers. A
fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of all consumers are “shoppers”, i.e. these consumers like
shopping or have zero search costs for other reasons. We assume that these
consumers know all prices in the market as well as whether some of the firms
set minimum price guarantees. The remaining fraction 1 − λ of consumers is
uninformed. These consumers engage in sequential search and get their first
price quotation for free, but any subsequent price quotation comes at a search
cost c. All consumers have identical valuation for the good denoted by v and
v > c. We assume that v is non-binding in the model, i.e. it is sufficiently large
4
not to influence reservation prices. Whether a firm provides MPGs or not is
revealed simultaneously with observing the price quotation of that firm. After
the consumer has bought the good there is an exogenous probability µ ∈ (0, 1)
that she observes (costlessly) the price of another firm. This information can
come either form friends (as in Galeotti (2009)) or just accidentally because she
noticed the price in the other store.
The timing in the model is as follows. First, firms simultaneously decide
on their prices and minimum price guarantees. Firm i decides to set up mini-
mum price guarantee with probability αi, and then set prices with a probability
distribution F i0(p) if no minimum price guarantees set, and with F
i
1(p) if it pro-
vides a MPG. Thus, the strategy of firm i is a tuple {αi, F i0(p), F i1(p)}. After
firms made their decisions, consumers decide. Shoppers buy at the firm with
the lowest price.4 After observing a first price, uninformed consumers have to
decide whether to buy at that firm or to continue search. After all purchasing
decisions have been made, customers have some probability of getting a price
quotation of the firm, which they did not search. If this price is less than the
purchase price, and the purchase was made in a firm providing an MPG, the
customer costlessly claims the price difference, which is paid back by the firm.
We look for symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria. In such an equilibrium
firms choose the same probability of setting MPGs and choose prices with the
same probability density function in case they do and do not set MPGs, i.e., we
look for equilibria where {α1, F 10 (p), F 11 (p)} = {α2, F 20 (p), F 21 (p)}.
3 Analysis
We start our analysis by investigating the search behaviour of uninformed con-
sumers. To this end, let us denote by {p
j
, pj} the lower and upper bounds of
Fj(p), j = 0, 1 and p = min{p0, p1}. Let F (p) = (1 − α)F0(p) + αF1(p) be the
weighted average of the two equilibrium price distributions. Then the optimal
search behaviour is defined by two reservation prices: one for firms with and
another for firms without an MPG.
Lemma 3.1. Uninformed consumers accept all prices at or below r0 at a firm
that does not provide MPG, and continue search otherwise; they accept all the
prices at or below r1 at a firm with MPG, and continue to search otherwise,
where {r0, r1} are defined by ∫ r0
p
F (p)dp = c∫ r1
p
F (p)dp =
c
1− µ
(1)
4In principle, if on of the firms charges the price lower than its competitor, while the
competitor sets up the minimum price guarantees, shopper should be indifferent between the
firms. We take one of possible models of their behaviour. One can think that there are
infinitely small costs  of claiming MPG, so shoppers prefer just to buy at the lowest price.
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Proof. After observing price r0 at a firm without minimum price guarantees, a
consumer has to be indifferent between buying now and continuing to search.
If the consumer continues to search, she proceeds to the next firm. The next
firm does not set MPG with probability 1 − α, and in this case the consumer
can choose the smallest price of r0 and a random price p that is distributed
according to F0. Similarly, for when she continues to search and happens to
visit a store with MPG, which occurs with probability α. Therefore
r0 = c+ (1− α) (F0(r0)E0(p|p < r0) + (1− F0(r0))r0)
+ α (F1(r0)E1(p|p < r0) + (1− F1(r0))r0)
using integration by parts, this expression can be simplified to the usual rule
determining the reservation prices.∫ r0
p
F (p)dp = c
Now consider the case when the customer found herself at a shop that pro-
vides MPG. In this case if the customer accepts the price there is a probability
µ that later she observes another price, which is either from a no-MPG store
(with probability 1 − α) or from a MPG store (with probability α). If she de-
cides to continues searching, the situation is similar to the case described above.
Therefore, the reservation price is defined by
(1− µ)r1 + µ[(1− α) (F0(r1)E0(p|p < r1) + (1− F0(r1))r1)
+ α (F1(r1)E1(p|p < r1) + (1− F1(r1))r1)] =
= c+ (1− α) (F0(r1)E0(p|p < r1) + (1− F0(r1))r1)
+ α (F1(r1)E1(p|p < r1) + (1− F1(r1))r1)
which simplifies to ∫ r1
p
F (p)dp =
c
1− µ
It immediately follows from the lemma that r1 > r0, i.e., a consumer is
willing to buy at a higher price if the firm happens to provide an MPG. This is
quite natural as the consumer has a probability to receive a pay-back in case a
MPG is provided. One can clearly see this happening for values of µ close to
one. Indeed, if µ is close to one, then the customer visiting a firm with a MPG
clause almost surely pays the minimum of the two prices in the market. If she
decides to proceed to search then she pays c and again buys at the minimum
of the two prices that are set. Thus, for high values of µ a consumer prefers to
stop searching in the MPG store, almost independently of the price it observes
there.
Now we turn to the equilibrium pricing behaviour of firms. It is a standard
result in the consumer search literature that both F0(p), F1(p) are atomless and
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that p0 = r0, p1 = r1. To provide a full characterization of equilibrium, we first
show that certain types of equilibria cannot exist.
Proposition 3.2. There is no symmetric equilibria with 0 < α < 1 and r0 > p1.
Proof. First, consider the profits of a firm which sets no minimum price guar-
antees. these profits are given by
pi0 = λ(1− F (p))p+ 1− λ2 p. (2)
On the other hand, profits of a firm that provides MPG are equal to
pi1 = λ(1−F (p))p+ 1− λ2 ((1− µ)p+ µF (p)E(p
′|p′ < p) + µ(1− F (p))p) , (3)
where the expectation is taken with respect to F (p) and p ≤ r1. It is quite
clear that equations (2) and (3) determine two different functional forms for
F (p). However, for the firm to be indifferent between setting and not setting a
MPG it has to be the case that pi0(p) = pi1(p) for all prices where the support of
two distributions overlap. But this cannot be the case in more than one point,
which together with that fact that r1 > r0 completes the proof.
Thus, if there is a positive probability that in equilibrium one firm provides
MPGs, while the other does not, then it has to be the case that the price
distributions are not overlapping. Given this result, we have three possible
candidate equilibria: (i) α = 0, (ii) α = 1 and (iii) 0 < α < 1 but then r0 ≤ p1,
i.e., a firm that does not provide an MPG will charge lower prices for sure than
a firm with MPG.
We next argue that an equilibrium where both firms provide MPGs cannot
exist either. In this, and the next propostions, it is important to realize that
reservation prices are defined with respect to corresponding equilibrium price
distributions. For example, if in an equilibrium both firms set MPG the con-
sumer strategy is still represented by two reservation prices (r0, r1), both of
them are defined by (1) using F (p) = F1(p). A similar point holds true for an
equilibrium candidate where none of the firms sets MPG.
Proposition 3.3. There is no equilibrium where both firms play α = 1.
Proof. If one firm chooses α = 1 then the competitor has a profitable deviation
by choosing α = 0 and price r0 which (as F (p) = F1(p) in this case) is defined
by
∫ r0
p
1
F1(p)dp = c. Indeed, since it has to be the case that p1 < r0 < r1, r0 lies
in the support of F1(p) and we get
pi(r0) = λ(1− F (r0))r0 + 1− λ2 r0 >
> λ(1− F (r0))r0 + 1− λ2 ((1− µ)r0 + µE(min(p, r0))) = pi1.
Therefore, there is a profitable deviation.
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The idea behind this proposition is basically as follows. If a firm deviates
from the proposed equilibrium where both firms provide MPG and simply sets
the same price (in the lower end of the equilibrium distribution), but aban-
dons the MPG, then the firm gets the same expected number of customers as
with MPG, but the expected price paid by non-shoppers is higher since these
consumers cannot exercise MPG anymore.
We now examine and characterize the remaining two candidate equilibria
sequentially.
Proposition 3.4. For all values of parameters there is an equilibrium where
both firms choose α = 0. The equilibrium price distribution in this case is
F0(p) = 1− 1− λ2λ
r0 − p
p
(4)
Proof. Since F (p) = F0(p) we have∫ r0
p
F0(p)dp = c∫ r1
p
F0(p)dp =
c
1− µ.
In equilibrium each firms gets a profit of pi0 = 1−λ2 r0. Assume, one firm
deviates and provides MPGs. Then the highest possible profit that can be
obtained is by charging p = r1. Indeed, it is clear that a firm only benefits
from the deviation if p > r0 (otherwise it gets the same number of customers,
but might experience a loss from searchers who can exercise MPG), but then
the shoppers would not buy from this firm anyway, so the firm has to extract
maximum profits from shoppers, which is attained by charging p = r1. Then
pi1 =
1− λ
2
((1− µ)r1 + µE(p|p < r1)) = 1− λ2 ((1− µ)r1 + µ(r0 − c))
so that
pi1 > pi0 ⇔ r1 − r0 > µc1− µ
But we have
r1 − r0 =
∫ r1
r0
1dp =
∫ r1
r0
F0(p)dp =
∫ r1
p
F0(p)dp−
∫ r0
p
F0(p)dp =
c
1− µ − c =
µc
1− µ
Thus, the best possible deviation gives the same payoff and a firm cannot
strictly benefit from deviating.
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Finally, we focus on the intermediate case where firms do provide MPGs
with some probability. The following proposition establishes existence of an
equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Proposition 3.5. An equilibrium with α ∈ (0, 1) exists if and only if
1 > µ >
4λ2
(1− λ)2 ln 1−λ1+λ + 2λ(1 + λ)
>
2
3
(5)
Proof. See Appendix.
This result might seem to be a bit counterintuitive: firms set up (with some
probability) MPGs only if there is sufficient probability that customers would
exercise it. The explanation of course is that if µ is sufficiently high, consumers
would accept higher prices at the store with MPG which more than offsets the
adverse effect of exercising MPG on firms profits.
The following two Figures represent the relationship between the equilib-
rium probability of observing minimum price guarantees and the parameters of
the model. Equation (5) shows that the probability of observing other prices
should be relatively large. Figure 1 depicts the relation between the equilibrium
probability of firms offering MPGs and the probability with which consumers
observe another price quotation. The figure shows this relationship is positive:
α is increasing with µ. Though high values of µ imply that ex post most of
the consumers are informed ones, uninformed consumers are willing to buy at
higher prices for higher µ. If µ is close to one, customer’s are willing to accept
virtually any price lower than v. Therefore firms are more likely to set MPGs
and sell at higher prices when µ is large. Not surprisingly, Figure 2 shows that
the greater the fraction of shoppers λ the lower the probability with which firms
set MPG.
Figure 1: Equilibrium probability of MPG as a function of µ at λ = 0.2.
µ
α
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Figure 2: Equilibrium probability of MPG as a function of λ at µ = 0.8.
λ
α
Now we proceed with the comparative statics analysis. The following propo-
sition compares expected prices paid by consumers in the equilibrium with MPG
and in the equilibrium without it.
Proposition 3.6. Expected profits for firms in the equilibrium where MPGs
are offered with positive probability are higher than the expected profits in the
equilibrium without MPGs. As a consequence, in the equilibrium where MPGs
are offered consumers pay higher expected prices (after a possible execution of
MPG) than in the equilibrium without MPGs.
Proof. In fact, the equilibrium without MPG described by the same formulas
as the equilibrium with MPG when α is set to be zero. The level of equilibrium
profits for the equilibrium with MPG is
pi(α) =
λ(1− λ+ 2αλ)
2(1− α)λ+ (1− λ+ 2αλ) ln
(
1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
)c
Then
∂pi
∂α
=
4(1− α)λ3(
2(1− α)λ+ (1− λ+ 2αλ) ln
(
1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
))2 c > 0
Proposition 3.7 shows the “anticompetitive” effect of a MPG in a search en-
vironment in the sense that in the equilibrium with MPGs the expected price is
higher than in the equilibrium where MPGs are not offered for sure. The source
of the anticompetitive effect is, however, different from that so far studied in the
literature. It is not the case here that there is some type of collusive behaviour
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between the firms where MPGs play the role of a monitoring device. In our case
the result is fully driven by consumer behaviour, namely by the willingness of
consumers to accept higher prices when firms do offer MPG. Another interesting
observation is that the higher expected price paid in the equilibrium with MPG
comes from two sources: (i) A firm charging an MPG can set a higher prices
on average because of the higher reservation price of consumers at firms with
an MPG and (ii) other firms without MPG react to these higher prices by set-
ting higher prices themselves. Thus, also a firm that effectively does not charge
MPGs has a higher price paid in the equilibrium where MPGs are charged with
some positive probability compared to the equilibrium without MPGs. Figure
3 shows how a firm’s expected profits depend on µ in the equilibrium where
MPGs are offered with some probability and the equilibrium profits without
MPGs. In the latter case, profits are, of course, a constant, whereas they are
exponentially increasing in µ whenever this equilibrium exists.
Figure 3: Expected profits as a function of µ at λ = 0.2.
µ
pi
No MPGs
MPGs
4 Price-beating and free-lunch strategies
We next turn to the question whether firms will ever choose to provide price
beating guarantees (PBG), if they do not announce (advertise) this policy in
advance before consumers search for prices. To study this question, assume
firms not only guarantee the purchase at the minimum price in the market if a
lower price has been observed, but to compensate the customer even further by
informing the customer that if she provides evidence of a lower price, say p′, the
effective purchase price will be βp′, where β ≤ 1. The probability with which a
price-beating strategy is chosen is (again) denoted by the probability α.
Even without a characterisation of the optimal search rule, we can argue
that it is never optimal for a firm to offer a price beating strategies if it does not
11
announce this policy in advance.5 In the following two propositions we assume
that prices charged are less or equal to corresponding reservation prices.
Proposition 4.1. It is never optimal for a firm to offer a price beating policy
with β < 1.
Proof. Consider the profit function of a firm in an equilibrium where it provides
a price-beating policy β:
pi = λ ((1− α)(1− F (p))p+ F (p)E(βp′|p′ < p))
+ 1−λ2 ((1− µ)p+ µ(1− F (p))p+ µF (p)E(βp′|p′ < p))
(6)
The first term of this formula represent the profit the firm gets from informed
customers. These consumers buy when this firm either has the highest price as
in that case they buy in order to exercise the price beating guarantee, or when
the other firm has a higher price and does not offer a price beating policy. The
last term represents the profit from uninformed customers. These consumers
effectively buy at price p either because they are not informed about another
price, or because the other firm charges a higher price. If the other firm charges
a lower price, these consumers effectively pay a fraction of this lower price if they
are informed about it. If the firm deviates and charges a higher β, it receives
a higher profit as ∂∂βE(βp
′|p′ < p) > 0 and the equilibrium price distribution is
unaffected by the deviation. Thus, we have ∂pi∂β > 0 and therefore it is optimal
for a firm to set β = 1.
This result shows that in markets where PBGs are not announced to con-
sumers in advance so that consumers only are aware of these guarantees once
they are in the shop and see the prices offered, price-matching is always pre-
ferred to price-beating. This comes from the fact that price-beating in these
markets only affects the price the firm receives from those consumers who know
the other firm has a lower price, but it does not affect the number of consumers.
Therefore, for each individual firm it is better to choose β = 1, though if both
firms were to stick to some β < 1 it would result in higher profits per firm.
Instead of offering price-beating strategies companies could compensate the
price difference (match the price) and offer a “free lunch” on top of that. Thus,
instead of offering βp′ the firm offers p′−x, where x is the value of the “lunch”.
The analysis and the results are very similar, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 4.2. It is never optimal for a firm to offer a price beating policy
with x > 0.
Proof. Consider the profit function of a firm in an equilibrium where it offers:
pi = λ ((1− α)(1− F (p))p+ F (p)E(p′ − x|p′ < p))
+ 1−λ2 ((1− µ)p+ µ(1− F (p))p+ µF (p)E(p′ − x|p′ < p))
(7)
5http://www.besparingsmeter.nl:80/2009/06/17/winkelen/sla-je-slag-bij-ah/ reports cases
where students bring cases with beer out of the supermarket Albert Heijn. After that Albert
Heijn stopped this policy.
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∂pi
∂x < 0 because
∂
∂βE(p
′ − x|p′ < p) < 0. Therefore it is optimal for the firm
to choose x as low as possible, therefore x = 0.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the effect of firms offering price matching and price beat-
ing strategies in a consumer search model where reservation prices are endoge-
nously determined. We restrict the analysis to markets where consumers are
uninformed about whether or not firms offer minimum price guarantees before
they come to the shop. We show that the effects of price matching and price
beating are very different. Price matching can be observed in equilibrium, but
only as an outcome of an equilibrium where firms randomize the decision to set
minimum price guarantees. This may explain why multi-product firms (such as
supermarkets and electronics shops) offer these policies over an ever changing
group of products (if they offer them at all). We show that in the equilibrium
where firms offer minimum price guarantees with strictly positive probability,
the expected prices consumers pay are higher than in the equilibrium where no
firm sets minimum price guarantees. The main reason for this result is that
consumers’ reservation prices increase considerably as they factor in the proba-
bility that they will be informed about lower prices later (and get their money
back) and therefore they are more eager to buy now even if the price is relatively
high. Importantly, even a shop that does not use minimum price guarantees sets
higher prices on average. this basically follows as MPGs soften the competition.
Price beating strategies are different and it is never optimal to set them.
The main reason is that firms do not gain additional consumers by setting such
policies and only risk to get lower expected prices in case the competitor has a
lower price.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.6
To prove the proposition we explicitly construct and equilibrium and than show,
that there is such a value of α that all the equilibrium conditions are satisfied.
Equilibrium price distribution support contains two parts: [p, r0] ∪ [p1, r1].
The lower part of the support. The lower part of the support is defined
by three equations:
pi = λ(1− F (p))p+ 1− λ
2
p
F (p) = 0
F (r0) = 1− α
These three equations allow to write down everything as a function of (r0, α).
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Indeed,
pi(r0, α) =
2αλ+ 1− λ
2
r0 (8)
p(r0, α) =
2αλ+ 1− λ
1 + λ
r0
F (p; r0, α) =
(1 + λ)p− (1− λ+ 2αλ)r0
2λp
Which using optimal search rule∫ r0
p
F (p)dp = c
gives an expression for r0:
r0 =
2λc
2(1− α)λ+ (1− λ+ 2αλ) ln
(
1−λ+2αλ
1+λ
) (9)
Thus, if the value of α is known the probability distribution on the lower
part of the support is fully described.
The upper part of the support. Now let’s consider the upper part.
The profit function is defined by:
pi = λ(1− F (p))p+ 1− λ
2
(
p− µ
∫ p
p
F (q)dq
)
(10)
Since
∫ r1
p
F (p)dp = c1−µ we get
pi =
1− λ
2
(
r1 − µc1− µ
)
Same way since
∫ p
1
p
F (p)dp = c+ (1− α)(p
1
− r0) we get
pi = αλp
1
+
1− λ
2
(
p− µ(c+ (1− α)(p
1
− r0))
)
Now, using equations (8) and (9) we can get expressions for r1 and p1 as
functions of α.
r1 =
2λ(1− λ(1− (2− µ)α) + αµ) + (1− λ)(1− λ+ 2αλ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ
(1− λ)(1− µ)
(
2(1− α)λ+ (1− λ+ 2αλ) ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ
) c
p
1
=
(1− λ+ 2αλ)
(
2λ+ (1− λ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ
)
(1− λ(1− (2− µ)α− µ)− µ(1− α))
(
2(1− α)λ+ (1− λ+ 2αλ) ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ
)c
14
Determination of α. To determine the value of α we use the following ap-
proach. We solve for the probability distribution on the upper part of the sup-
port using differential equation (10). The solution requires determination of the
constant, say Q using boundary condition. We have two of them: F (p
1
) = 1−α
and F (r1) = 1, which gives us two values of the constant Q1 and Q2. Since
the solution must satisfy both boundary conditions we get have to get Q1 = Q2
which gives us the equation on α. Note, that we do not calculate the optimal
search integral here, since it is already incorporated in determination of r16.
We start with the following differential equation:
Ay(x) +Bxy′(x) + Cx+D = 0 (11)
The solution of this equation is
y(x) = QxA/B − Cx
A+B
− D
A
Now, if we compare (11) with (10) we can spot that it is the same equation
with x = p, y(x) =
∫ p
p
F (p)dp, y′(x) = F (p), A = − 1−λ2 µ, B = −λ, C = 1+λ2 ,
D = pi.
Thus, the equilibrium price distribution is defined by
F (p) =
1 + λ
2λ+ (1− λ)µ −Q
(1− λ)µ
2λ
p−
2λ+(1−λ)µ
2λ
where Q is determined by initial conditions. F (r1) = 1 and F (p1) = 1 − α
give two values Q1 and Q2 which has to be equal.
Q1 = −2λ(1− λ)µ
(
1− 1+λ2λ+(1−λ)µ
)
(
c(2λ(1−λ(1−α(2−µ)−µ)−µ(1−α))−(1−λ)(1−(1−2α)λ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ )
(1−λ)(1−µ)(2(1−α)λ+(1−(1−2α)λ) ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ )
)1+ (1−λ)µ2λ
Q2 = −2λ(1− λ)µ
(
1− α− 1+λ2λ+(1−λ)µ
)
(
c(1−(1−2α)λ)(2λ+(1−λ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ )
(1−λ(1−α(2−µ)−µ)−µ(1−α))(2(1−α)λ+(1−(1−2α)λ) ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ )
)1+ (1−λ)µ2λ
Equation Q1 = Q2 can be reduced to:
6Another, may be more natural approach, is to use just one boundary condition and then
explicitly calculate the search integral to get the equation for r0 and α, as we did for the lower
part of the support. However this approach results in more analytical complications, so we
use the one presented in the text.
15
(
(1− λ)(1− µ)
1− λ(1− α(2− µ)− µ)− (1− α)µ
) (1−λ)µ
2λ
=
2λ(1− λ+ 2αλ− α(1 + λ)µ) + (1− λ)(1− λ+ 2αλ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ
(1− λ+ 2αλ)
(
2λ+ (1− λ)µ ln 1−λ+2αλ1+λ
)

2λ+(1−λ)µ
2λ
(12)
First, we evaluate (12) at α = 0. It is easy to spot that both LHS and RHS
takes values of 1 for all (λ, µ). Second, we claim that the LHS of equation (12)
evaluated at α = 1 is greater than the RHS. Indeed, after canceling some terms
the equation can be rewritten as
(
1−λ
1+λ
) (1−λ)µ
2λ
= (1 − µ). Thus, the LHS is
increasing in λ and as λ→ 0 it goes to eµ which is greater than (1−µ). Finally,
we examine the behaviour both of LHS and RHS around α = 0. Obviously,
if LHS decreases faster than the RHS, there must be an intersection point at
α ∈ (0, 1). The derivative of the LHS with respect to α evaluated at α = 0
equals to −µ(λ(2−µ)+µ)2λ(1−µ) . The derivative of RHS evaluated at α = 0 equals to
− (1+λ)(λ(2−µ)+µ)µ
(1−λ)(2λ+(1−λ)µ ln 1−λ1+λ )
. Solving
−µ(λ(2− µ) + µ)
2λ(1− µ) < −
(1 + λ)(λ(2− µ) + µ)µ
(1− λ)
(
2λ+ (1− λ)µ ln 1−λ1+λ
)
gives µ ∈ (− 2λ1−λ , 0) ∪ ( 4λ
2
(1−λ)2 ln 1−λ1+λ+2λ(1+λ)
,∞). Given that µ is between 0
and 1 we get (5).
Now we show that f(λ) ≡ 4λ2
(1−λ)2 ln 1−λ1+λ+2λ(1+λ)
> 2/3. First, this expression
is increasing in λ with f(1) = 1. Second, we take a limit limλ→0 f(λ). By
applying l’Hopital’s rule twice we get:
lim
λ→0
f(λ) =
8
4 3+λ(3+λ)(1+λ)2 + 2 ln
1−λ
1+λ
=
2
3
To prove that (5) is also a necessary condition we show that if the derivative
of LHS of (12) is greater than the derivative of the RHS at α = 0 than the LHS
is higher than the RHS for any other α. That implies that there is no such a
value of α which can equate both sides of the equation. Note, that both LHS
and RHS of (12) are smooth functions in α, λ, µ. Therefore, we can directly
verify the result on a mesh for (α, λ, µ) ∈ (0, 1)3. Numerical verification shows
that (5) is indeed not only sufficient, but a necessary condition as well.
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